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• Wemodel optimistic fair exchange between two groups.
• We define security in optimistic fair exchange of distributed signatures (OFEDS).
• OFEDS supports most generic access structure.
• The first OFEDS scheme is presented with robustness and non-interactive properties.
• Our scheme is proven secure under standard assumption.
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a b s t r a c t
We introduce the concept of optimistic fair exchange of distributed signatures (OFEDS) which allows
two groups of parties to fairly exchange digital signatures. Specifically, an authorized set of parties from
each group can jointly take part in the protocol on behalf of the affiliated group to fulfill obligation,
and a semi-trusted arbitrator will intervene in the protocol only when there are disputes between
two sides. Our OFEDS extends the functionality of optimistic fair exchange of threshold signatures to
a more generic case. We formalize the security model of OFEDS, in which besides the standard security
requirements for existing optimistic fair exchange protocols, robustness is incorporated so that OFEDS can
be successfully performed even when there exist some dishonest signers. We propose a non-interactive
construction of OFEDS based on the well-established Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) assumption.
Our proposal shows that there exists CDH-based OFEDS for any general monotone access structure.
Theoretical and experimental analyses demonstrate our OFEDS construction has reasonable efficiency
for real applications.
© 2016 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Optimistic fair exchange (OFE) [1] allows twoparties to exchange
electronic items (e.g., electronic contracts) in a fair manner,
∗ Correspondence to: School of Information, Renmin University of China, No. 59,
Zhongguanchun Avenue, Haidian District, 100872, Beijing, China. Tel.: +86 10 6251
2492.
E-mail address: bo.qin@ruc.edu.cn (B. Qin).
i.e., either both parties obtain their expected items or neither party
can do. A standard OFE protocol involves three parties, namely,
party A, party B and an arbitrator. Among them, the arbitrator is
semi-trusted and is intended to help A and B for resolving disputes
during the item exchange process. In practice, the arbitrator is
usually keeping offline unless either party A or B is cheated. The
OFE protocol is carried out in three regular moves and two standby
moves. Specifically, the party A first generates a partial signature
which may be a verifiable encryption [2] of her full signature and
gives it to B, who validates the received item and sends back
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Table 1
Comparison of OFE schemes in multi-user setting.
Scheme Functionality
Dodis, Lee and Yum [36] OFE between two individualswith one arbitrator
Huang et al. [37] OFE between two individualswith one arbitrator
Huang et al. [38] OFE between two individualswith one arbitrator
Küpçü and Lysyanskaya [39] OFE between two individualswithmultiple arbitrators
Huang, Wong and Susilo [4] OFE between two parties on behalf of respective groups
Qu et al. [5] OFE between two parties on behalf of respective rings
Wang et al. [6] OFE between two authorized setsmore than a threshold
This paper OFE between two authorized sets of generic form
his full signature to A when the validation result is true. If A
accepts B’s full signature and further provides her full signature
to B, then these two parties have successfully exchanged their
digital items, i.e., full signatures. Otherwise, if A refuses to fulfill
her responsibility after receiving B’s valid item, then B can ask the
arbitrator for resolution by running standby moves. Note that OFE
is different from oblivious transfer (OT) protocol [3], where OT
allows users to exchange secret information in a fair manner.
Since its introduction, OFE has been received considerable at-
tentions, of which several protocols were proposed in multi-user
settings, e.g., [4–6]. However, all the existing OFE protocols can-
not effectively support the applications in amore complicated sce-
nario as follows. For example, a group of manufactories trying to
sign a contract with a group of selling companies so that they
can unify prices to avoid over competition. The authorized subset
(e.g., several qualified representatives) is capable to sign it on be-
half of the affiliated group, while none of the unauthorized ones
can do so. In fact, here, the authorized sets constitute a monotone
access structure which is similar to that in secret sharing schemes
[7–9] and distributed signature schemes [10–14], which capture
the threshold ones as special cases. Threshold primitives [15–18]
can only support regular access policies, i.e., a set is authorized if
it comprises at least a quorum of parties. Therefore, even the OFE
protocol of threshold signatures [6] cannot apply to this generic
setting. Note that the most related protocols, i.e., OFE protocols of
group/ring signatures [4,5], just allow a single member from dif-
ferent groups to fairly exchange their digital items on behalf of re-
spective groups. These types of protocols also cannot be applied to
such complicated scenarios. This motivates the work in this paper.
1.1. Our contribution
We observe a gap in existing OFE models and instantiated pro-
tocols (as shown in Table 1). Specifically, to the best of our knowl-
edge, there are no studies in the public literatures which work
on fairly exchanging distributed signatures with regard to gen-
eral monotone access structures. The monotone access structure
has the desirable expressiveness to define the authorized set, and
hence, is flexible and versatile in practice. Therefore, motivated by
the above scenario, we extend the existing OFE concept to a multi-
user setting in which both groups A and B consist of multiple users,
and the corresponding authorized subsets of A and B can perform
the role of these groups for fairly exchanging digital items. Partic-
ularly, we are interested in providing a universal solution to such
applications.
First, we introduce the notion of optimistic fair exchange of
distributed signatures (OFEDS) and present a formal definition.
We also formalize the security model of OFEDS which includes
the security requirements of standard OFE protocols, such as
ambiguity and security against signers, verifier and arbitrator,
respectively. The difference lies in that these security requirements
are defined on a group of parties, rather than a single party
(see Section 3.2 for details). Furthermore, a security requirement
called robustness is incorporated so that distributed signatures can
be successfully exchanged in a fair way even if there are some
malicious users (signers).
Second, we present a non-interactive CDH-based OFEDS con-
struction with better expressiveness, where the generic access
structure is modeled bymonotone span program (MSP). It is shown
that the proposed OFEDS protocol meets all the security require-
ments that defined in the security model. Since the facts that every
monotone access structure can be realized by a linear secret sharing
scheme (LSSS) and LSSS has been proved equivalent to MSP [7], our
construction can apply to any monotone access structures. There-
fore, our construction covers the existing threshold-oriented OFE
protocols as a special case.
Third, we thoroughly analyze our OFEDS construction from
both theoretical and experimental perspectives. Only the user-
key-generation algorithm has linear computation costs with the
cardinality of the signer set. The efficiencies of partial-/full-
signature-reconstruction algorithms are related to the signer num-
ber in an authorized set. All the other algorithms have constant
computations. Therefore, the performance analyses show that the
proposed OFEDS protocol is practical to support real applications.
Compared to the preliminary version [19], the contribution of
this full paper lies in that the majority of Section 1 is revised,
and moreover, the formal security model of OFEDS as well as the
security proofs of our construction in the random oracle model are
presented. The performance evaluations and analyses of ourOFEDS
construction are also the new results of this paper.
1.2. Related work
OFE for exchanging items between two parties in a fair waywas
first proposed by Asokan, Schunter and Waidner [1], where the
arbitrator is needed only in case of depute occurrence. Fairness is an
important and desirable property in many real-world applications
and has received plenty of research attentions. For example,
fairness in e-payments [20] guarantees the involved parties could
get either their bought goods or payments with the help of
online/offline bank. Fairness is also a fundamental requirement
for players when carrying out online contests [21] like e-auctions
and e-games, in the sense that all of unfair competitions should be
prevented from the system.
To prevent the verifier (i.e., party B) from abusing the received
partial signature from party A, Huang et al. [22] introduced am-
biguousOFEwhich enhances the security at the signer side. In [23],
Huang, Wong and Susilo presented an interactive ambiguous OFE
based on the designated confirmer signature such that when gen-
erating the partial signature, the signer should interact with the
verifier. Furthermore, Wang et al. [24] managed to enhance the se-
curity at both sides of A and B, that is, the communication tran-
scripts will leak nothing with regard to the involved parties. To
this end, they introduced the concept of perfect ambiguous OFE.
Recently, Huang et al. [25] investigated privacy-preserving OFE
with more rigorous security in the sense that even the arbitrator
cannot learn the resolved signatures, which further enhances the
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security of perfect ambiguous OFE. For simplifying the certifi-
cate management as in the traditional public-key crypto-systems,
Zhang et al. [26,27] presented identity based OFE protocols based
on the identity based verifiably encrypted signatures.
Since the seminal work of [1], a lot of efforts have been
devoted to optimistic fair exchange in multi-user settings. The
existing multi-user OFE protocols fall into two categories. For
the first type, each party is an independent user and different
electronic item can be exchanged between different pair of related
users. Asokan, Schunter and Waidner [28] proposed an optimistic
protocol for multi-user fair exchange, where each user should sign
on an expected global description matrix of the exchange and
commit to all the electronic items which he will send to other
parties, and thus each user can exchange electronic items with all
others over unreliable networks. Note that in their protocol [28],
a user can exchange different items with different users and
reasonably much information should be broadcasted. Franklin
and Tsudik [29] and Khill et al. [30] investigated a relatively
simplified scenario where each user receives an item from the
neighboring user and gives an item to next one. The same case
was also studied by Bao et al. [31] but with an off-line trusted
neutral party. Technically, their multi-user fair exchange protocol
is designed based on verifiable encryption. Their protocol [31] was
subsequently improved by González-Deleito and Markowitch [32]
without assuming that the protocol initiator is also trusted by all
users. Mukhamedov, Kremer and Ritter [33] revisited the problem
in [29,34] using the strand space model. The exclusion scenarios in
a multi-user setting have been discussed in [35].
For the second type OFE protocols in multi-user settings, the
electronic items are exchanged between two groups of parties,
i.e., a group of signers and a group of verifiers, which are
summarized in Table 1. Dodis, Lee and Yum [36] observed that the
single-party security of OFE protocols cannot guaranteemulti-user
security. In their formal security model [36], every party in each
group also acts as an individual. Huang et al. [37] strengthened
their securitymodel [36] by introducing the chosen-keymodel into
OFE in multi-user settings and considered the malicious arbitrator
working in an adaptivemodel. On the other hand, some conditions
(e.g., an extra property called strong resolution-ambiguity) were
found by Huang et al. [38], under which the security of OFE in
single-user setting is preserved in multi-user setting. In order
to reduce the risk of relying on a single semi-trusted arbitrator,
Küpçü and Lysyanskaya [39] considered the case where multiple
arbitrators are involved. Huang, Wong and Susilo [4] proposed a
group-oriented OFE which allows fair and anonymous exchange
of digital items between two users on behalf of their respectively
affiliated groups. In addition, they [4] also proposed a generic
transformation from a group-oriented OFE into an ambiguous
OFE [22]. Qu et al. [5] presented OFE of ring signatures free of group
managers. Recently, a threshold-oriented OFE was introduced
by Wang et al. [6] such that threshold signatures can be fairly
exchanged, in which the group’s duty is jointly taken by at least
a threshold of its users.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Bilinear pairing and computational assumptions
Bilinear Map [40]. Suppose G = ⟨g⟩ and GT are cyclic groups of
prime order q. The map eˆ : G× G→ GT is bilinear if it satisfies:
• Bilinearity: ∀a, b∈R G and ∀µ, ν ∈R Zq, eˆ(aµ, bν) = eˆ(a, b)µν ;
• Non-degeneracy: eˆ(g, g) ≠ 1;
• Efficiency: the map eˆ and the group operations in G and GT are
efficiently computable.
Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) Problem [41]. Let G = ⟨g⟩
be a cyclic group of prime order q. Given a triple (g, gµ, gν) for
randomly chosen values µ, ν ∈R Z∗q , compute gµν .
Definition 1 (CDH Assumption [41]). For any probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A and any random values
µ, ν ∈R Z∗q , the probability of solving CDH problem Pr[A(g, gµ, gν)= gµν] is negligible.
2.2. Secret sharing
Secret sharing [42,43,7] is a method to securely distribute a
secret among a group S of n parties, where each party gets one
share, and the secret can be recovered only if an authorized set of
parties pool their shares together. All the authorized sets constitute
an access structureΠ which satisfies monotone increasing property
in which any set contains an authorized set is also authorized. In
this paper,we are only interested in prefect secret sharing schemes,
that is, any unauthorized sets cannot get any information about the
shared secret. We use Π¯ = 2S \ Π to denote the collection of all
the unauthorized sets, where 2S is the power set of S. Similarly,
Π¯ satisfiesmonotone decreasing property. Accordingly, we will use
Π¯X ⊆ Π¯ to denote the collection of all the maximal unauthorized
sets.
Definition 2 (Perfect Secret Sharing [7]). Let Π be a monotone
access structure defined on a party set S and F be a finite set
of secrets. Given a secret sharing scheme Φ = ⟨Dis(·),Rec(·)⟩
realizing Π , where Dis(·) and Rec(·) are randomized distribution
algorithm and reconstruction algorithm, respectively. We say that
Φ is a perfect secret sharing scheme if the following two properties
are satisfied.
• For any authorized set A ∈ Π and any secret k ∈ F, k can be
definitely recovered from the corresponding shares given to A,
that is, Pr[Rec(A shares←−−− Dis(k)) = k] = 1;
• For any unauthorized set B ∈ Π¯ and any two distinct secrets
k1, k2 ∈ F, the distributions on the shares given to B of
respective secrets, i.e, B
shares←−−− Dis(k1) and B shares←−−− Dis(k2) are
identical.
In this paper, any given monotone access structure will be
realized by linear secret sharing schemes [7,10,44]. This indicates
that bothDis(·) andRec(·) are in fact performed as linear functions.
Definition 3 (Monotone Span Program [45,7]). Let S be a party set,
a and b be two positive integers. A monotone span program is
defined asM = (F, τ⃗ ,Ma×b, ρ), where F is a finite field, τ⃗ ∈ Fb is a
target vector,Ma×b is an a×bmatrix overF andρ : {1, 2, . . . , a} →
S labels each row ofMa×b by a party in S. For any set S ⊆ S, there
exists a sub-matrix MS which comprises all the rows of Ma×b that
labeled by the parties in S. A set S ⊆ S is accepted byM if the target
vector τ⃗ can be spanned by the rows ofMS . An access structureΠ
which defined on S is accepted byM if and only ifM accepts all
the sets S ∈ Π .
MSP was first formalized by Karchmer and Wigderson [45]
and has been implicitly discussed before by Brickell [46]. We
will use MSP to model LSSS, i.e., there exists a matrix Ma×b such
that Dis(·) can be modeled by a mapping from the rows of Ma×b
to the party set S, and Rec(·) can be modeled by the linear
relationships among the rows in this matrix. Since MSP can realize
any general monotone access structure, there may be several rows
of Ma×b labeled to one party. For convenience and without loss
of generality, we assume there are one-to-one correspondence
between the rows of Ma×b and the parties in S. Therefore, in the
upcoming sections, we will use the vector v⃗i = ρ−1(si) to denote
the row ofMa×b related to the party si ∈ S.
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Table 2
Notations.
Notation Meaning
S A set of signers {s1, . . . , sn}
S A subset of signers S ⊆ S
S An authorized set of signers
S˜ An unauthorized set of signers
Π A monotone access structure
Π¯ The collection of unauthorized sets
λ Security parameter
m Message
PKA, SKA Public/private keys of arbitrator
PKU Public key of the signer set
SKi Secret-key-share of signer si
σˆi, σi Partial-/Full-signature-fragment of signer si
σˆ , σ Partial/Full signature
q A large prime
G,GT Cyclic groups associated with a bilinear map eˆ
H A hash function
Table 3
Acronyms in OFEDS.
Acronym Algorithm
AKGen Arbitrator key generation algorithm
UKGen User key generation algorithm
PSign, FSign Distributed partial/full signature scheme
PSGen, FSGen Partial/Full signature fragment generation algorithm
PSVrfy, FSVrfy Partial/Full signature fragment verification algorithm
PSRCon, FSRCon Partial/Full signature reconstruction algorithm
PVrfy, FVrfy Partial/Full signature verification algorithm
Res Resolution algorithm
3. Modeling optimistic fair exchange of distributed signatures
For ease of presentation in the rest parts, we assume that there
are a group of signers but only a single verifier. Table 2 summarizes
the frequently used notations when defining OFEDS framework
and presenting OFEDS scheme, while Table 3 summarizes the
acronyms of each algorithm in OFEDS.
3.1. Definition of OFEDS
Let Π be a monotone access structure realized by MSP on the
signer set S = {s1, . . . , sn} and λ ∈ N be a security parameter.
A Π-optimistic fair exchange protocol of distributed signatures
is defined as a series of non-interactive algorithms OFEDS =
⟨AKGen,UKGen, PSign = ⟨PSGen, PSVrfy, PSRCon, PVrfy⟩, FSign =
⟨FSGen, FSVrfy, FSRCon, FVrfy⟩, Res⟩, where all the algorithms are
computable in time polynomial in λ.
AKGen: on input 1λ, the (randomized) arbitrator key generation
algorithm outputs a pair of public and private keys (PKA, SKA) for
the arbitrator, denoted by, (PKA, SKA)← AKGen(1λ).
UKGen: on input 1λ and a monotone access structure Π , the
(randomized) user key generation algorithm outputs a public key
PKU for the signer set S and n secret-key-shares (SK1, . . . , SKn)
for signers. This procedure is denoted by (PKU , SK1, . . . , SKn) ←
UKGen(1λ,Π).
PSign: PSign can be viewed as a distributed signature scheme
which enables an authorized set of signers to jointly generate a
partial signature for any given message. In detail, it consists of the
following four algorithms:
• PSGen: on input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, a secret-key-share SKi
of signer si, the signer set’s public key PKU and the arbitrator’s
public key PKA, the partial signature fragment generation
algorithm computes a partial-signature-fragment σˆi for signer
si. We denote this procedure by σˆi ← PSGen(m, SKi, PKU , PKA)
for any si ∈ S.
• PSVrfy: on input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, a partial-signature-
fragment σˆi of signer si ∈ S, the signer set’s public key PKU and
the arbitrator’s public key PKA, the partial signature fragment
verification algorithm validates σˆi and outputs ‘‘1’’ if it is valid
form, and ‘‘0’’ otherwise.We denote this procedure by {1, 0} ←
PSVrfy(m, σˆi, PKU , PKA).
• PSRCon: on input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, some partial-
signature-fragments {σˆi | si ∈ S} where S ⊆ S, the signer set’s
public key PKU and the arbitrator’s public key PKA, the partial
signature reconstruction algorithm outputs a partial signature
σˆ or⊥ according toΠ . We denote this procedure by {σˆ ,⊥} ←
PSRCon(m, {σˆi | si ∈ S ∧ S ⊆ S}, PKU , PKA,Π).
• PVrfy: on input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, a partial signature
σˆ , the signer set’s public key PKU and the arbitrator’s public
key PKA, the partial signature verification algorithm validates
σˆ and outputs ‘‘1’’ if it is valid for m, and ‘‘0’’ otherwise. The
procedure is denoted by {1, 0} ← PVrfy(m, σˆ , PKU , PKA).
FSign: Similar to PSign, FSign allows an authorized set of
signers to jointly generate a full signature for any given message:
• FSGen: on input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, a secret-key-share
SKi, the signer set’s public key PKU and the arbitrator’s public
key PKA, the full signature fragment generation algorithm
computes a full-signature-fragment σi for signer si. We denote
this procedure by σi ← FSGen(m, SKi, PKU , PKA) for any si ∈ S.
• FSVrfy: on input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, a full-signature-
fragment σi of signer si ∈ S, the signer set’s public key PKU
and the arbitrator’s public key PKA, the full signature fragment
verification algorithm validates σi and outputs ‘‘1’’ if it is valid
form, and ‘‘0’’ otherwise.We denote this procedure by {1, 0} ←
FSVrfy(m, σi, PKU , PKA).
• FSRCon: on input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, some full-signature-
fragments {σi | si ∈ S}where S ⊆ S, the signer set’s public key
PKU and the arbitrator’s public key PKA, the full signature recon-
struction algorithm outputs a full signature σ or⊥ according to
Π . We denote this procedure by {σ ,⊥} ← FSRCon(m, {σi |
si ∈ S ∧ S ⊆ S}, PKU , PKA,Π).
• FVrfy: on input m ∈ {0, 1}∗, a full signature σ , the signer set’s
public key PKU and the arbitrator’s public key PKA, the full sig-
nature verification algorithm validates σ and outputs ‘‘1’’ if it is
valid for m, and ‘‘0’’ otherwise. The procedure is denoted by
{1, 0} ← FVrfy(m, σ , PKU , PKA).
Res: on input a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, a partial signature σˆ , the
signer set’s public key PKU and the arbitrator’s public–private key
pair (PKA, SKA), the resolution algorithm outputs a full signature σ
for messagem if σˆ is valid form, and⊥ otherwise. We denote this
procedure by {σ ,⊥} ← Res(m, σˆ , PKU , SKA, PKA).
A typical procedure of optimistic fair exchange of distributed
signatures is shown in Fig. 1.
3.2. Security requirements
We proceed to define the security model of OFEDS, i.e., Π-
optimistic fair exchange protocol of distributed signatures.
Correctness for aΠ-OFEDS means that a valid partial (resp. full)
signature for any message can be definitely reconstructed from an
authorized set of valid partial-(resp. full)-signature-fragments, and
a valid partial signature can always be resolved into a valid full
signature by the arbitrator.
Definition 4 (Correctness). Π-OFEDS is said to be correct if for
any (PKA, SKA) ← AKGen(1λ), any (PKU , SK1, . . . , SKn) ←
UKGen(1λ,Π), any S ∈ Π and any message m∈R{0, 1}∗, all the
following statements hold
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Fig. 1. A procedure of OFEDS.
• PVrfy(m, σˆ , PKU , PKA) = 1 for any σˆ ← PSRCon(m, {PSGen(m,
SKi, PKU , PKA) | si ∈ S}, PKU , PKA,Π);
• FVrfy(m, σ , PKU , PKA) = 1 for anyσ ← FSRCon(m, {FSGen(m,
SKi, PKU , PKA) | si ∈ S}, PKU , PKA,Π);
• FVrfy(m, σ , PKU , PKA) = 1 for any σ ← Res(m, σˆ , PKU ,
SKA, PKA).
Resolution ambiguity for aΠ-OFEDS means that a full signature
reconstructed from an authorized set of full-signature-fragments
cannot be distinguished from the one resolved by the arbitrator.
Definition 5 (Resolution Ambiguity). Π-OFEDS is said to be am-
biguous if for any (PKA, SKA) ← AKGen(1λ), any (PKU , SK1, . . . ,
SKn) ← UKGen(1λ,Π), any S ∈ Π and any message m∈R{0, 1}∗,
there exists no polynomial-time algorithm which can distin-
guish σ ← Res(m, σˆ , PKU , SKA, PKA) from σ ← FSRCon(m,
{FSGen(m, SKi, PKU , PKA) | si ∈ S}, PKU , PKA,Π), where σˆ ←
PSRCon(m, {PSGen(m, SKi, PKU , PKA) | si ∈ S}, PKU , PKA,Π).
Robustness for a Π-OFEDS means that the electronic items
can be still successfully fairly exchanged even if there are an
unauthorized set of signers deviate from the protocol.
Definition 6 (Robustness). Suppose there is a malicious adversary
A who controls an unauthorized set S˜ ∈ Π¯ of signers. Π-
OFEDS is said to be Π¯-robust if for any (PKA, SKA) ← AKGen(1λ),
any (PKU , SK1, . . . , SKn) ← UKGen(1λ,Π) and any message
m∈R{0, 1}∗, there exists S ⊆ S \ S˜ such that
• PVrfy(m, σˆ , PKU , PKA) = 1 for any σˆ ← PSRCon(m, {σˆi′ | si ∈
S˜} ∪ {σˆi | si ∈ S}, PKU , PKA,Π), where σˆi ← PSGen(m, SKi,
PKU , PKA);
• FVrfy(m, σ , PKU , PKA) = 1 for any σ ← FSRCon(m, {σ ′i | si ∈
S˜} ∪ {σi | si ∈ S}, PKU , PKA,Π), where σi ← FSGen(m, SKi,
PKU , PKA);
• FVrfy(m, σ , PKU , PKA) = 1 for any σ ← Res(m, σˆ , PKU ,
SKA, PKA), where σˆ ← PSRCon(m, {σˆi′ | si ∈ S˜} ∪ {σˆi | si ∈
S}, PKU , PKA,Π) and σˆi ← PSGen(m, SKi, PKU , PKA).
A secureΠ-OFEDS should ensure that evenwhen all the signers
are dishonest, they still cannot fool the verifier and the arbitrator.
In otherwords, a partial signature reconstructed from their partial-
signature-fragments should always be resolved into a valid full
signature.
Definition 7 (Security Against Signers). A Π-OFEDS is secure
against signers, if there is no adversary A who controls all the
signers can win in the following game in polynomial time:
After received the access structure Π from A, the challenger
runs algorithms AKGen(1λ) and UKGen(1λ,Π) to get the keys
(PKA, SKA, PKU , SK1, . . . , SKn) and sends (PKA, PKU , SK1, . . . , SKn)
back toA.
The adversary A adaptively sends qR (qR ∈ N) resolution
queries (mi, σˆ (i)) to the challenger, where mi ∈R{0, 1}∗. For each
query (mi, σˆ (i)), if PVrfy(mi, σˆ (i), PKU , PKA) = 1, then the
challenger answers σ (i) ← Res(mi, σˆ (i), PKU , SKA, PKA).
Eventually, the adversary A wins in the game if she outputs a
pair (m, σˆ ) that satisfies
• m ∉ {mi | i ∈ [1, qR]};
• PVrfy(m, σˆ , PKU , PKA) = 1;
• FVrfy(m, σ , PKU , PKA) = 0 for the resolved full signature σ ←
Res(m, σˆ , PKU , SKA, PKA).
A secure Π-OFEDS should also ensure that even when the
verifier colludes with an unauthorized set of signers, they are still
unable to generate a valid full-signature-forgery.
Definition 8 (Security Against Verifier). A Π-OFEDS is secure
against verifier, if there is no adversaryAwho controls the verifier
and an unauthorized set S˜ ∈ Π¯ of signers can win in the following
game in polynomial time:
After received an access structure Π and a corrupted set
S˜ from A, the challenger runs algorithms AKGen(1λ) and
UKGen(1λ,Π) to get the keys (PKA, SKA, PKU , SK1, . . . , SKn) and
sends (PKA, PKU , {SKi | si ∈ S˜}) back toA.
The adversary A can adaptively make the following queries to
the challenger, of which PSGen queries and Res queries cannot
be requested for the same messages. Since A has obtained all
the secret-key-shares of the signers in the corrupted set S˜, it is
reasonable to simply let all the following PSGen and FSGen queries
be made for uncorrupted signers.
• PSGen queries: the adversaryA can adaptively submit qP (qP ∈
N) such queries (mi, sj) to the challenger, where mi ∈R{0, 1}∗
and sj ∈ S \ S˜. For each query, the challenger responds with
σˆj
(i) ← PSGen(mi, SKj, PKU , PKA);
• FSGen queries: the adversaryA can adaptively submit qF (qF ∈
N) such queries (mi, sj) to the challenger, where mi ∈R{0, 1}∗
and sj ∈ S \ S˜. For each query, the challenger responds with
σ
(i)
j ← FSGen(mi, SKj, PKU , PKA);
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• Res queries: the adversary A can adaptively submit qR
(qR ∈ N) resolution queries (mi, σˆ (i)) to the challenger where
mi ∈R{0, 1}∗. For each query, if PVrfy(mi, σˆ (i), PKU , PKA) = 1,
then the challenger answersσ (i) ← Res(mi, σˆ (i), PKU , SKA, PKA).
Eventually, the adversary A wins in the game if she outputs
a pair (m, σ ) such that FVrfy(m, σ , PKU , PKA) = 1, where m ∈
{0, 1}∗ has neither been requested before in FSGen queries nor
been asked in Res queries.
A secure Π-OFEDS should also ensure that even when the
arbitrator colludes with an unauthorized set of signers, they still
cannot produce a valid full-signature-forgery.
Definition 9 (Security Against Arbitrator). A Π-OFEDS is secure
against arbitrator, if there is no adversary A who controls the
arbitrator and an unauthorized set S˜ ∈ Π¯ of signers can win in
the following game in polynomial time:
After received an access structure Π and a corrupted set
S˜ from A, the challenger runs algorithms AKGen(1λ) and
UKGen(1λ,Π) to get the keys (PKA, SKA, PKU , SK1, . . . , SKn) and
sends (PKA, SKA, PKU , {SKi | si ∈ S˜}) back toA.
The adversary A can adaptively make the following queries to
the challenger. Similar to the above security game against verifier,
we can also simply let all the following queries be made with
regard to uncorrupted signers.
• PSGen queries: the adversaryA can adaptively submit qP (qP ∈
N) queries (mi, sj) to the challenger, where mi ∈R{0, 1}∗ and
sj ∈ S \ S˜. For each query, the challenger responds with σˆj(i) ←
PSGen(mi, SKj, PKU , PKA);• FSGen queries: the adversaryA can adaptively submit qF (qF ∈
N) queries (mi, sj) to the challenger, where mi ∈R{0, 1}∗ and
sj ∈ S \ S˜. For each query, the challenger responds with σ (i)j ←
FSGen(mi, SKj, PKU , PKA).
Eventually, the adversary A wins in the game if she outputs
a pair (m, σ ) such that FVrfy(m, σ , PKU , PKA) = 1, where m ∈
{0, 1}∗ has neither been requested before in PSGen queries nor
been asked in FSGen queries.
4. Construction
4.1. A CDH-based OFEDS protocol
We proceed to give our construction which is inspired byWang
et al.’s protocol [6]. Let q be a prime which is determined by the
security parameter λ(λ ∈ N). Suppose eˆ : G × G → GT is an
efficient bilinear map, where G = ⟨g⟩ and GT are cyclic groups
of order q. Let H : {0, 1}∗ → G be a hash function and Π be a
monotone access structure realized by MSP on the signer set S =
{s1, . . . , sn}. Our construction comprises the following algorithms.
AKGen: This algorithm produces the arbitrator’s public–private
key pair as (PKA, SKA) = (gy, y), where y∈R Z∗q .
UKGen: This algorithm chooses a random vector w⃗ ∈R(Zq)b and
computes SKi = w⃗ · v⃗i mod q for each signer si ∈ S. Here, b is the
column number of MSP matrix. The public key of the signer set S
is set to be
PKU = (PK0, PK1, . . . , PKn) =

gSK0 , gSK1 , . . . , gSKn

,
where SK0 = w⃗ · τ⃗ mod q.
PSign: PSign consists of the following four algorithms:
• PSGen: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, each signer si ∈ S
randomly picks an element ri ∈R Z∗q and computes a partial-
signature-fragment σˆi = (αˆi, βˆi), where
αˆi = H(m)SKi · PK riA and βˆi = g ri .
• PSVrfy: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a purported partial-
signature-fragment σˆi = (αˆi, βˆi), this algorithm outputs ‘‘1’’ if
the following equality holds
eˆ(αˆi, g)
?= eˆ(H(m), PKi) · eˆ(PKA, βˆi).
Otherwise, it outputs ‘‘0’’.
• PSRCon: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a group of valid
partial-signature-fragments {σˆi | si ∈ S ∧ S ⊆ S} on m. If
S ∈ Π , then there exist a group of values {ci ∈ Zq | si ∈ S}
which can be found by solving the system of linear equations
such that
τ⃗ =

si∈S
civ⃗i mod q.
Thereby, the partial signature σˆ = (αˆ, βˆ) can be reconstructed
by computing
αˆ =

si∈S
αˆi
ci and βˆ =

si∈S
βˆi
ci
.
Otherwise, it outputs⊥.
• PVrfy: Given a messagem ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a purported partial sig-
nature σˆ = (αˆ, βˆ), this algorithm outputs ‘‘1’’ if the following
equality holds
eˆ(αˆ, g) ?= eˆ (H(m), PK0) · eˆ(PKA, βˆ). (1)
Otherwise, it outputs ‘‘0’’.
FSign: FSign consists of the following four algorithms:
• FSGen: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗, each signer si ∈ S
computes a full-signature-fragment as σi = H(m)SKi .
• FSVrfy: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a purported full-
signature-fragment σi, this algorithm outputs ‘‘1’’ if eˆ(σi, g)
?=
eˆ (H(m), PKi) holds; otherwise it outputs ‘‘0’’.
• FSRCon: Given a messagem ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a group of valid full-
signature-fragments {σi | si ∈ S ∧ S ⊆ S} on m. If S ∈ Π ,
then there exist a group of values {ci ∈ Zq | si ∈ S} as
discussed in algorithm PSRCon. Therefore, the full signature σ
can be reconstructed as follows
σ =

si∈S
σi
ci .
Otherwise, it outputs⊥.
• FVrfy: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a purported full
signature σ , this algorithm outputs ‘‘1’’ if eˆ(σ , g) ?= eˆ(H(m),
PK0) holds; otherwise it outputs ‘‘0’’.
Res: Given a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a partial signature σˆ =
(αˆ, βˆ), this algorithm outputs a full signature σ = αˆ/βˆSKA if σˆ is
valid under Equality (1); otherwise it outputs⊥.
Theorem 1. The above proposedΠ-OFEDS protocol is correct.
Proof. For any authorized set S ∈ Π , there exists a collection of
values {ci ∈ Zq | si ∈ S} such that
si∈S
civ⃗i = τ⃗ mod q,
because S is accepted by MSP. In fact, these values can be found by
solving the system of linear equations. Therefore,
SK0 = w⃗ · τ⃗ = w⃗ ·

si∈S
civ⃗i

=

si∈S
ci (w⃗ · v⃗i) =

si∈S
ciSKi mod q.
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Then, the reconstruction of the partial signature σˆ = (αˆ, βˆ) from
partial-signature-fragments {σˆi = (αˆi, βˆi) | si ∈ S} is due to
αˆ =

si∈S
αˆi
ci = H(m)

si∈S
ciSKi
PKA

si∈S
ciri
= H(m)SK0PK rA,
and
βˆ =

si∈S
βˆi
ci = g

si∈S
ciri
= g r ,
where r =si∈S ciri mod q is also random because all the ri’s are
randomly chosen. Furthermore, the reconstructedpartial signature
σˆ = (αˆ, βˆ) can be validated due to the following facts
eˆ(αˆ, g) = eˆ H(m)SK0PK rA, g
= eˆ H(m)SK0 , g · eˆ PK rA, g
= eˆ H(m), gSK0 · eˆ PKA, g r
= eˆ (H(m), PK0) · eˆ

PKA, βˆ

.
Similarly, the full signature σ can be reconstructed from full-
signature-fragments {σi | si ∈ S} as follows
σ =

si∈S
σi
ci =

si∈S

H(m)SKi
ci = H(m)si∈S ciSKi = H(m)SK0 ,
and its validity is easy to see.
Given a valid partial signature σˆ = (αˆ, βˆ), the corresponding
full signature can be resolved as follows
σ = αˆ/βˆSKA = H(m)
SK0PK rA
(g r)y
= H(m)
SK0gyr
gyr
= H(m)SK0 ,
which can also be easily validated. 
4.2. Security analysis
The resolution ambiguity of our protocol is straightforward and
the proof is omitted.
Theorem 2. The proposedΠ-OFEDS is resolution ambiguous.
Theorem 3. The proposedΠ-OFEDS is robust if the union set of any
two unauthorized sets does not cover the signer set.
Proof. Suppose an unauthorized set S˜ ∈ Π¯ is controlled by
the adversary A. If the union set of any two unauthorized sets
cannot cover the signer set, then S \ S˜ ∈ Π . In our construction
(specifically, by PSVrfy and FSVrfy), all the invalid partial- and
full-signature-fragments can be detected before executing the
reconstruction algorithms, i.e., PSRCon and FSRCon. Therefore, the
partial and full signature can be further successfully reconstructed
from the other ones with regard to S \ S˜. 
Theorem 4. The proposed Π-OFEDS protocol is secure against
signers in the random oracle model, assuming the CDH assumption
holds.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that for any given valid message
and partial signature pair (m, σˆ ) under the public keys (PKA, PKU)
of the arbitrator and the signer set, a valid full signature σ for
m can always be successfully resolved. In fact, if the Equality (1)
holds, then σ = αˆ/(βˆSKA) will satisfy eˆ(σ , g) = eˆ H(m)SK0 , g =
eˆ (H(m), PK0). 
Theorem 5. The proposed Π-OFEDS protocol is secure against
verifier in the random oracle model, assuming the CDH assumption
holds.
Proof. Suppose there is an adversary A who controls the verifier
and an unauthorized signer set S˜ ∈ Π¯ , and breaks the proposed
protocol. We will construct an algorithm E to solve the CDH
problem on G by interacting with A. Specifically, the algorithm E
is given a random CDH problem instance (gµ, gν) and manages to
output gµν . In the following discussions, we assume that for any
message m, a hash query should be requested by A before it is
involved in any other queries. Also, for a forgery (m, σˆ ) or (m, σ )
outputted byA, a hash form should have been asked before.
We distinguish two types of adversaries,
• Type-1 adversary A1, who will output a forgery (m, σ ) where
m has been requested for partial-signature-fragments;
• Type-2 adversary A2, who will output a forgery (m, σ ) where
m has not been requested for partial-signature-fragments.
Type-1 adversary A1. We construct E1 to solve the given CDH
instance by interacting withA1.
Setup: When receiving a corrupted set S˜ and an access
structure Π represented by MSP from A1, the algorithm E1
responds with the corresponding parameters as follows. The
algorithm E1 picks y∈R Z∗q , and sets PKA = gyν and PK0 = gµ. Since
Π¯ is monotone decreasing, there exists a maximal unauthorized
set Sˆ ∈ Π¯X such that S˜ ⊆ Sˆ. To calculate the secret-key-shares for
the signers in Sˆ, the algorithm E1 first picks w⃗′ ∈R(Zq)b, and then
computes
SKi = w⃗′ · v⃗i mod q and PKi = gSKi
for each signer si ∈ Sˆ. Furthermore, for each signer sj ∈ S \ Sˆ, we
know Sˆ∪{sj} ∈ Π , that is, Sˆ∪{sj} is accepted byMSP. Accordingly,
v⃗j can be linearly combined by τ⃗ and {v⃗i | si ∈ Sˆ} as follows
v⃗j = c0τ⃗ +

si∈Sˆ
civ⃗i mod q,
where all the coefficients are over Zq and can be found by solving
the system of linear equations. Therefore, for each signer sj ∈ S \ Sˆ,
the algorithm E1 can calculate
PKj = PK c00 ·

si∈Sˆ
PKici .
In this way, the algorithm E1 obtains PKU = (PK0, . . . , PKn). At last,
the algorithm E1 givesA1 the tuple (PKA, PKU , {SKi | si ∈ S˜}). Due
to the perfectness of MSP, SK0 will not be leaked toA1.
Queries: The adversary A1 can adaptively submit the
following queries to E1. To respond, the algorithm E1 should
maintain a list ofmessages onwhichA1 has been requested in each
of the following queries.
• Hash queries: Without loss of generality, we assume that A1
asks for exactly qH such queries in total and E1 can choose a
value h¯∈R[1, qH ]. To respond a hash query on message mi, if
mi ≠ mh¯, the algorithm E1 sends H(mi) = gθi to A1, where
θi ∈R Z∗q; otherwise, the algorithm E1 sends back H(mi) = gν .• PSGen queries: The adversary A1 asks for a partial-signature-
fragment on message m of the signer sj ∈ S \ S˜. If m has been
queried as mℓ (ℓ ≠ h¯), then E1 responds with (PK θℓj PK rA, g r),
where r ∈R Z∗q; otherwise, i.e., m = mh¯, the algorithm E1 picks
r ∈R Z∗q and returns a partial-signature-fragment as follows
– if sj ∈ Sˆ \ S˜, then E1 responds with
(gν)SKjPK rA, g
r ;
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– if sj ∈ S \ Sˆ, then E1 returns
(gν)

si∈Sˆ
ciSKi+yr
, (gµ)−c0y
−1
g r

,
where ci’s are the same as we have mentioned above and
−c0y−1 is computed over Zq;
• FSGen queries: The adversary A1 asks for a full-signature-
fragment query on message m of the signer sj ∈ S \ S˜. If m
has been queried as mℓ (ℓ ≠ h¯), then E1 responds with PK θℓj ;
otherwise, i.e.,m = mh¯, the algorithm E1 aborts.
• Res queries: The adversaryA1 asks for a resolution query on the
pair (m, σˆ = (αˆ, βˆ)). If σˆ is invalid form according to Equality
(1), then E1 responds with⊥. Otherwise, ifm has been queried
as mℓ (ℓ ≠ h¯), then E1 responds with PK θℓ0 ; if m = mh¯, the
algorithm E1 aborts.
Outputs: Finally, the adversary A1 outputs a pair (m, σ ) of
message and full signature toE1. Sincemmust have been requested
for a hash value, we have Pr[m = mh¯] = 1/qH . This implies that
E1 can succeed in outputting σ as the solution for the given CDH
instance with probability 1/qH , which is due to
eˆ(σ , g) = eˆH(m), PK0 = eˆH(mh¯), PK0
= eˆ(gν, gµ) = eˆ(g, g)µν .
Type-2 adversary A2. We construct E2 to solve the given CDH
instance by interacting withA2.
Setup: When receiving a corrupted set S˜ and an access
structure Π which is represented by MSP from A2, the algorithm
E2 responds with the corresponding parameters as follows. The
algorithm E2 picks y∈R Z∗q as SKA, and sets PKA = gy and PK0 = gµ.
The algorithm E2 then proceeds in the same way as Setup with
regard to A1, and at last gives A2 the tuple (PKA, PKU , {SKi | si ∈
S˜}). Due to the perfectness of LSSS defined by MSP, the secret key
SK0 is uniformly random toA2.
Queries: The adversary A2 can adaptively submit the
following queries to E2. To respond, the algorithm E2 maintains a
list of messages on which A2 has been requested in each of the
following queries.
• Hash queries: Assume A2 asks for exactly qH such queries and
E2 chooses h¯∈R[1, qH ]. To respond a hash query onmessagemi,
if mi ≠ mh¯, the algorithm E2 sends H(mi) = gθi to A2, where
θi ∈R Z∗q; otherwise, the algorithm E2 sends back H(mi) = gν .
• PSGen queries: The adversary A2 asks for a partial-signature-
fragment on message m of the signer sj ∈ S \ S˜. If m has been
queried as mℓ (ℓ ≠ h¯), then E2 responds with (PK θℓj PK rA, g r),
where r ∈R Z∗q; otherwise, i.e.,m = mh¯, the algorithm E2 aborts.
• FSGen queries: The adversary A2 asks for a full-signature-
fragment query on message m of the signer sj ∈ S \ S˜. If m
has been queried as mℓ (ℓ ≠ h¯), then E2 responds with PK θℓj ;
otherwise, i.e.,m = mh¯, the algorithm E2 aborts.
• Res queries: The adversary A2 asks for a full-signature
resolution query on a pair (m, σˆ = (αˆ, βˆ)). If σˆ is a valid partial
signature ofm according to Equality (1), then E1 responds with
αˆ/(βˆ)y; otherwise, the algorithm E2 responds with⊥.
Outputs:When responding for a Res query, the algorithm E2
can succeed in outputting σ = αˆ/(βˆ)y as the solution for the
given CDH instance with probability 1/qH . Since each message m
in Res queries has been requested for a hash value before, we have
Pr[m = mh¯] = 1/qH . This indicates Pr[σ = gµν] = 1/qH due to
the following facts
eˆ(σ , g) = eˆ

αˆ/(βˆ)y, g

= eˆ(αˆ, g)
eˆ

(βˆ)y, g
 = eˆ (H(m), PK0) eˆ(PKA, βˆ)
eˆ

(βˆ)y, g

= eˆ (H(mh¯), PK0) = eˆ(gν, gµ) = eˆ(g, g)µν .
This completes the proof. 
Theorem 6. The proposed Π-OFEDS protocol is secure against
arbitrator in the random oracle model, assuming the CDH assumption
holds.
Proof. Suppose there is an adversaryAwho controls the arbitrator
and an unauthorized set S˜ ∈ Π¯ of signers, and breaks the proposed
protocol. We will construct an algorithm E to solve the CDH
problem on G by interacting with A. That is, the algorithm E is
given a random CDH problem instance (gµ, gν) and is required
to output gµν . The following discussions also assume that a hash
query for any message m should be requested by A before any
other queries. For a forgery (m, σ ) outputted by A, a hash for m
must have been requested before.
Setup:After received a corrupted set S˜ and an access structure
Π represented byMSP fromA, the algorithmE proceeds as follows
to respond with parameters. The algorithm E picks y∈R Z∗q , and
sets SKA = y, PKA = gy and PK0 = gµ. All the other parameters
such as SKi (si ∈ Sˆ), PK0 and PKi (si ∈ S) are generated in the same
way as Setup in the proof of Theorem 5. At last, the algorithm
E gives A the tuple (PKA, SKA, PKU , {SKi | si ∈ S˜}). Due to the
perfectness of LSSS defined byMSP, the secret key SK0 is uniformly
random toA.
Queries: The adversary A can adaptively submit the follow-
ing queries to E . To respond, the algorithm E maintains a list of
messages on whichA has been requested in each of the following
queries.
• Hash queries: Assume that A asks for exactly qH such queries
and E chooses h¯∈R[1, qH ]. To respond a hash query onmessage
mi, ifmi ≠ mh¯, the algorithm E sends H(mi) = gθi toA, where
θi ∈R Z∗q; otherwise, the algorithm E sends back H(mi) = gν .• PSGen queries: The adversary A asks for a partial-signature-
fragment on message m of the signer sj ∈ S \ S˜. If m has been
queried as mℓ (ℓ ≠ h¯), then E responds with (PK θℓj PK rA, g r),
where r ∈R Z∗q; otherwise, i.e.,m = mh¯, the algorithm E aborts.• FSGen queries: The adversary A asks for a full-signature-
fragment query on message m of the signer sj ∈ S \ S˜. If m
has been queried as mℓ (ℓ ≠ h¯), then E responds with PK θℓj ;
otherwise, i.e.,m = mh¯, the algorithm E aborts.
Outputs: Finally, the adversary A outputs a pair (m, σ ) of
message and full signature to E . As m has been asked for a hash
value, we have Pr[m = mh¯] = 1/qH . Note that when m = mh¯,
we get eˆ(σ , g) = eˆ(H(m), PK0) = eˆ(H(mh¯), PK0) = eˆ(gν, gµ) =
eˆ(g, g)µν , which implies that E can succeed in outputting σ as the
solution for the given CDH instance with probability 1/qH . 
4.3. Performance analysis
We analyze the efficiency of our OFEDS protocol. The results are
summarized in Tables 4 and 5, where n is the cardinality of the
signer set S. Table 4 illustrates the performance of our instantiated
OFEDS protocol in terms of element sizes of arbitrator’s public key
PKA and private key SKA, signer set’s public key PKU , signer’s secret-
key-share SKi, partial-signature σˆ (-fragment σˆi) and full-signature
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Table 4
Performance of OFEDS in terms of the element size.
PKA SKA PKU SKi σˆi, σˆ σi, σ
Element size 1sG 1sq (n+ 1)sG 1sq 2sG 1sG
Table 5
Computation costs of OFEDS.
Algorithm Computation costs
AKGen 1E
UKGen (n+1)(bM+(b−1)A+E)
PSign
PSGen 1h+ 3E+ 1M
PSVrfy 1h+ 3P+ 1M
PSRCon 1L+2|S|E+2(|S|−1)M
PVrfy 1h+ 3P+ 1M
FSign
FSGen 1h+ 1E
FSVrfy 1h+ 2P
FSRCon 1L+ |S|E+ (|S| − 1)M
FVrfy 1h+ 2P
Res 1h+ 3P+ 1E+ 2M
σ (-fragment σi). The element sizes of bilinear group G and finite
field Zq are denoted by sG and sq, respectively. It can be seen that
only the signer set’s public key PKU whose size is linear with the
number of signers, while all the other parameters contain constant
elements. Therefore, the proposed OFEDS protocol is efficient in
storage and communication.
Table 5 summarizes the computation costs of the proposed
OFEDS scheme. In the table, we use the notations h, L, A, M, E, P
to denote a hash evaluation of H , the costs for solving the system
of equations, one addition, one multiplication, one exponentiation
and one bilinear pairing, respectively. We also use b and |S| to
represent the column of MSP matrix and the cardinality of an
authorized set S, respectively. It is easy to see that only the user-
key-generation-algorithm UKGen whose computation costs are
associatedwith the signer number of setS. Note thatUKGen can be
executed in advance, i.e., before exchanging exact items. Therefore,
the proposed OFEDS protocol enjoys desirable online performance
and is practical in real applications.
We proceed to evaluate experimental performance of our
OFEDS protocol. The experiments are conducted in C programming
language by employing Pairing Based Cryptography library (PBC,1
http://crypto.stanford.edu/pbc/), and are carried out on a laptop
with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-5200U CPU @ 2.20 GHz and 4GB RAM.
The elliptic curve is of type y2 = x3+xwith |q| = 160 bits and sG =
512 bits. It is assumed that there are in total 30 signers, i.e., n = 30.
It seems that 30 is a reasonable bound of signer number for most
application cases. In the experiment, the arbitrator and each signer
first publish the corresponding public keys, and keep private key or
private key shares secretly. Then, the signers will work jointly ac-
cording to a pre-defined access structure to exchange a randomly
chosen message with a verifier. That is, they commit to their item
by sending partial-signature-fragments to the verifier, who can
validate the received information and further reconstruct a partial
signature if they are associated to an authorized set. In a similar
way, the signers generate and give the full-signature-fragments to
the verifier so that a full signature can be reconstructed froman au-
thorized set. The verifier can also get a valid one by interactingwith
the arbitrator according to the reconstructed partial signature, es-
pecially when the reconstructed full signature is invalided. The de-
tailed performance of each algorithm is elaborated as follows.
1 PBC library provides sufficient APIs that can be used to implement pairing-
based crypto-systems as well as conventional crypto-systems.
Fig. 2. Performance evaluation of OFEDS with n = 30.
Fig. 3. Partial signature reconstruction (n = 30).
The computation costs of the algorithms except PSRCon and
FSRCon are shown in Fig. 2. The algorithm AKGen requires one
exponentiation on G regardless the number of signers, which
takes roughly 5.2 ms. Although UKGen needs 130ms, the average
generation time of one pair of public/private keys is much more
efficient, i.e., just 4.19 ms. There is only one hash evaluation and
one exponentiation of FSGen. It takes about half time of running
PSGen to generate one signature fragment. The algorithms PSVrfy
and PVrfy take roughly equal time. The similar case happens to the
algorithms FSVrfy and FVrfy. When Res resolves a full-signature,
it takes no more than 4ms in our experiment. Both algorithms
PSRCon and FSRCon are determined by the cardinality of the
authorized signer set. In fact, each authorized set should hold
at least b rows of MSP matrix when reconstructing partial-/full-
signature. We consider several cases with b = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25,
the experimental results are shown in Figs. 3 and 4, respectively.
Note that during partial-/full-signature reconstruction, a system of
linear equations over Zq should be solved before carrying out real
reconstruction procedure. It can be seen that each case in Fig. 4 is
about twice as efficient as its counterpart in Fig. 3. This is coincident
with the theoretical analyses.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced the notion of optimistic fair
exchange of distributed signatures. This primitive allows two
groups to fairly exchange digital items in a way such that their
38 Y. Wang et al. / Future Generation Computer Systems 62 (2016) 29–39
Fig. 4. Full signature reconstruction (n = 30).
duties are jointly carried out by authorized sets of respective group
members. We formalized the security model for OFEDS which
captures the standard security requirements of existing OFE as
well as robustness to ensure the sender’s duty can be successfully
performed even when there are some dishonest signers. Our
OFEDS extends OFE of threshold signatures to a more general
case and thus supports more complicated applications. We also
proposed a CDH-based OFEDS construction and proved its security
under standard assumptions in the randommodel. Our theoretical
and experimental performance analyses further show that the
proposed OFEDS construction has reasonable efficiency to support
real-world applications.
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